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Trending current accounts pose a challenge for intertemporal open-economy macro models. This paper
shows that a two-country representative-agent business cycle model is able to explain the historical
time-paths of the US and Japanese current accounts, both of which display trends but in opposite directions.
Households have a state-dependent subjective discount factor such that they become relatively impatient
(patient) when societal consumption is abnormally high (low). We present agents in the model with
historical observations on the exogenous state variables, run the economy, and compare the current
account implied by the model with the data. We find that the model generates national saving behavior
that matches the current account's trend. Investment dynamics are important for explaining current
account fluctuations around the trend, but not for the trend itself. The model also accounts for the timing
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Standard economic theory guides us to think of the current account as a smoothing instrument.
Countries are predicted to save in the good states of nature and to dissave in the bad states.
Since good and bad states tend to cancel out over time, the current account as a fraction of
GDP should ￿ uctuate around a ￿xed mean. Thus it is puzzling why, with the exception of a
fairly pronounced recovery between 1987 and 1991, the US current account has trended down
for 35 years between 1970 to 2005. The rate of decline also accelerated in 1997. Between 1991
and 1997, the current account fell by 1:5 percent of GDP but between 1997 and 2005 it fell an
additional 5:9 of GDP. This persistent deterioration has captured the interest of researchers
and policy makers.
The current account of Japan also poses a challenge but in the opposite direction. Beginning
with a de￿cit near 4 percent of GDP in 1974, the Japanese current account steadily improved
over time reaching 3.8 percent of GDP in 2005. A striking feature of the Japanese experience
is that their current account remained in a strong surplus position even during the severe real
estate and stock price de￿ ation of the 1990s. These sorts of long-horizon current account trends
have resisted explanation by standard intertemporal open economy models.1
This paper demonstrates that a two-country representative-agent business-cycle model is
able to provide a quantitative explanation of the US and Japanese current accounts from 1970
to 2005. Not only does the model explain the contrasting and divergent trends of the external
balances for these two countries, it also explains the magnitude of their cyclical movements and
the timing of the current account reversals that mark their ￿ uctuations around the trend. We
employ a two-country DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) model that is entirely
standard except that the subjective discount factor in household preferences is state dependent.
What is the motivation for incorporating EDFs (endogenous discount factors) into prefer-
ences?2 It is that the primary reason that the standard model cannot explain trending current
accounts is because people with FDFs (￿xed discount factors) want to save too much in the
1For the US, Nason and Rogers (2006) and Engel and Rogers (2006) show that standard models have a
striking inability to match the trend especially since 1997. Campa and GavilÆn (2007) ￿nd that present-value
restrictions are unrejected for six countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) in the
Euro zone but these are countries whose current accounts do not display trends.
We use the term ￿ long-horizon￿to refer to the span of our data (1970￿ 2005) which we distinguish from the
￿ long-run,￿which we use to describe the steady state. We do not think that the current account trends for the
US and Japan is steady-state behavior.
2EDFs have been used in small-open economy models by Obstfeld (1982), Mendoza (1991), Schmitt￿ Grohe
(1998), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), and Kim and Kose (2003). This paper is the ￿rst to do so in a
two-country business cycle model with the objective of understanding current account dynamics.
2good state and to borrow too much in the bad state to be consistent with the data. If long-
horizon current account trends are driven by divergent saving behavior between home and
ROW (rest-of-world) households (and we present evidence that this is a reasonable working
hypothesis), then we want the environment to induce Americans to rationally choose to be
chronically low savers and for the Japanese to rationally choose to be chronically high savers.3
In our framework this is achieved with a three-parameter model of the EDF where people
become relatively impatient when societal consumption is abnormally high (above the steady
state) and relatively patient when societal consumption is abnormally low. While equilibrium
di⁄erences between home and foreign rates of time preference emerge in the short run, these
di⁄erences vanish in the long-run. The mechanism embodied in our model works in the same
direction as in Uzawa (1968) where the discount factor in his formulation is increasing in
current utility. The EDF creates behavior in an in￿nitely lived agent setting, that is qualita-
tively similar to the bu⁄er-stock saving that one observes in a population of heterogeneous and
￿nitely-lived agents with a precautionary savings motive (Carroll (1997, 2001, 2004)). Bu⁄er-
stock behavior attenuates the desire to save in the good state and to borrow in the bad state
and is consistent with the increase in the US personal saving rate since the onset of the recent
crisis (2008-2009).4
In the quantitative analysis of the model, we feed the historical data on the model￿ s exoge-
nous state variables (as opposed to generating them by a computer) into the calibrated model,
run the model, and observe the extent to which current account choices made by agents in the
model mimic the actual time paths of the data. The nested standard two-country model under
FDFs, which we take as the benchmark for comparison, performs badly. It usually predicts
the current account to trend in the wrong direction for extended periods of time and typically
fails to display the ￿ uctuations and turning points found in the data. The model with EDFs
in preferences on the other hand produces current account choices that successfully mimic the
magnitude, trends, and cyclical ￿ uctuations of the US and Japanese current accounts. Given
that the model can account for trending (in di⁄erent directions) current accounts, we ask if it is
able to explain the evolution of the UK current account which has ￿ uctuated around a modest
3In other work on saving and the current accoun, Ferrero (2007) studies the impact that demographic trends
have had for the US but ￿nds that they account for only a small fraction of the variation in the current account.
Fogli and Perri (2006) show that a reduction in precautionary saving in response to the ￿ Great Moderation￿
can explain about one-third of the US current account de￿cit in 2004, while Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-
Rull (2009) emphasize that ￿nancial integration between countries of varying ￿nancial development results in
increased international indebtedness of the advanced country.
4In 2007, the personal saving rate averaged 0.47 percent of national income whereas from 2008.1 through
2009.1 the average personal saving rate increased to 2.0 percent. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
3de￿cit with no obvious trend. We ￿nd that the EDF model is able to explain the historical
time path for the UK.
Modeling saving behavior is key to understanding the trend in the current account. How-
ever, variations in saving behavior tends to evolve slowly so it does not tell much of the story
about current account ￿ uctuations around the trend.5 Thus, in addition to enriching the
consumption￿ saving decision which is key to understanding the long-horizon trend, we show
that a model with capital and investment may be necessary for explaining short-run ￿ uctua-
tions around the trend. This is the ￿rst paper to incorporate EDFs into a two-country business
cycle model with the objective of understanding current account dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents and discusses
the current accounts that we seek to understand and o⁄ers some evidence to suggest why
primary emphasis should be placed on saving behavior to explain the trends. Section 3 presents
the two-country business cycle model upon which our quantitative work is based and discusses
the dynamic properties of the model. Section 4 reports our main assessment of the model in
which we examine current account outcomes implied by agent choices when they are presented
with historical data on total factor productivity and exogenous government spending as the
exogenous state vector. Section 5 concludes.
2 The data
The current accounts for the US, Japan, and the UK that we seek to understand are plotted
as a fraction of GDP in Figure 1. One immediately sees that there is substantial di⁄erences
across countries both in terms of their long-horizon trends and their cyclical behavior. The
sample begins in 1970 which roughly dates the beginning of the epoch of liberalized ￿nancial
markets among developed countries. The sample ends in 2005 due to data availability of the
23 high income OECD countries which we use to form the ROW.
The trending US current account. The U.S. current account has experienced a long
and sustained decline over this thirty ￿ve year period. The decline from 1975 to 1987 was
interrupted only by a small recovery between 1978￿ 1979. After a four-year recovery from a
four percent (of GDP) de￿cit in 1987 to an approximate balance in 1991, the decline resumed
in 1992. In 1997, a break in the trend appears in which the rate of deterioration accelerates.
The implied overall change in US indebtedness is economically signi￿cant. The cumulated
value of US de￿cits from 1950 to 2005 shows an increase in US indebtedness that amounts to a
5See Choi et al. (2008) who studied the US current account with EDFs in a two-country endowment model.
4whopping 52 percent of GDP in 2005.6 The US current account is relatively strongly counter
cyclical. Its correlation with HP (Hodrick￿ Prescott) ￿ltered GDP is ￿0:21.
The trending Japanese current account. The Japanese current account provides a sharp
contrast to the US. Early in the sample, Japan experienced a sharp decline between 1972 and
1974 which coincides with the ￿rst oil shock. After a rapid recovery from 1974 to 1975, the
Japanese account undergoes a sustained improvement in the surplus that is punctuated by
modest downturns in 1990, 1996, and 2001. It is interesting to note that Japan maintains a
healthy surplus during the ￿ lost decade￿of near zero growth that followed the real estate and
stock price de￿ ation in 1990￿ 1991. Instead of borrowing in states of low wealth and output,
the Japanese increased their lending to the ROW. The Japanese current account is weakly
counter cyclical. Its correlation with HP ￿ltered GDP is ￿0:09.
The non trending UK current account. The UK current account occupies a middle
ground between the US and Japan. This account exhibits a cycle from 1970 to 1978 that
attains a surplus of nearly 3 percent of GDP in 1973. Then from 1976 to 2005, the UK current
account has ￿ uctuated around a de￿cit near 1.2 percent of GDP and is characterized by the
absence of an obvious trend. Whereas the US and Japanese current accounts are counter
cyclical, the UK account is weakly procyclical. Its correlation with HP ￿ltered GDP is 0:10:
Current account comovers. Although the current account is the sum of the private saving
less investment (S ￿I) and the taxes less government spending (T ￿G), our paper focuses on
the implications of saving and investment behavior. The motivation for this begins with the
general conclusion from recent empirical work that the (T ￿ G) component is largely irrelevant
for current accounts of large countries.7 The scarcity of evidence of a twin-de￿cits phenomenon
is illustrated by Figure 2 which plots the current account and the ￿scal surplus (T ￿ G) as
6This does not necessarily mean that actual U.S. net indebtedness is 52 percent of GDP since this calculation
did not account for the initial net wealth and the valuation e⁄ects on the external wealth. Some authors have
questioned whether the U.S. net foreign asset position is as large as this calculation might suggest. Hausmann
and Sturzenegger (2007) suggest that o¢ cial statistics undervalue US foreign assets (their ￿ dark matter￿argu-
ment) while Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2005), Lane-Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Meissner
and Taylor (2008) argue since the US earns higher returns on foreign assets than foreigners do on US assets
(exhoribant privilege) that the US is still a net creditor. However, Curcuru et al. (2008) argue quite forcibly
that the data upon which these arguments made are not reliable.
7See Bems et al. (2007), Bussiere et al. (2005), Corsetti and Muller (2008), and Gruber and Kamin (2009).
5fractions of GDP for our three sample countries.8 The shaded areas identify time periods
when the current account surplus and the budget surplus move in opposite directions. The
plots begin in 1973 due to availability of the tax data.
For the US, the period of the 1970s and 1980s might have suggested the possibility of a twin-
de￿cit link as both de￿cits were seen to grow substantially. Upon closer inspection, however,
the two series comove in only eleven of the twenty years from 1973 to 1993￿ a proportion
indistinguishable from a realization of pure chance. Any suggestion of a twin-de￿cit link
completely falls apart in the latter half of the sample. From 1994 to 2001 the two accounts
diverge with the current account deteriorating and the budget surplus improving. Between
1993 and 2005, the current account and the budget comove in only three of twelve years.
For Japan, the rising surpluses in the current account and the budget during the 1980s
also may have created the appearance of a twin-de￿cits phenomenon. In 1990 however, the
relationship disintegrates in just as dramatic fashion as it does for the US. Between 1990
and 2005, the Japanese current account maintains a steady and persistent surplus while the
government￿ s budget undergoes a sharp and sustained decline. The two series change in the
same direction in only ten out of thirty two years in the sample.
Evidence of a twin-de￿cits relationship is only slightly stronger in the case of the UK. In
the early portion of the sample, the two series comove in twelve of ￿fteen years from 1973 to
1988 but comove in only six of the remaining seventeen years from 1989 to 2005. In total, the
UK de￿cits comove in only eighteen of thirty two years.
In light of this evidence, let us suppose that the current account evolves independently of
the ￿scal balance. Then it must comove with the saving-investment balance. This turns out to
be the case for our sample of countries. Figure 3 plots the current account and the country￿ s
saving-investment balance relative to ROW.9 These observations have been normalized to
emphasize their comovements.
For the US, the saving-investment imbalance tracks both the current account￿ s protracted
downward trend as well as the timing of the turning points that mark the cyclical ￿ uctuations.
The current account and the saving￿ investment balance move in opposite directions in only
three years of the thirty two year sample.
For Japan, the saving-investment balance also shows a very tight relation to the current
account with both series steadily rising over the sample and showing a close correspondence
8Source data for budget surplus: For the US, Economic Report of the President, for the UK, O¢ ce for
National Statistics, and for Japan, the International Monetary Fund￿ s International Financial Statistics. We
plot these data beginning in 1973 due to the availability of the tax data.
9Saving is de￿ned as GDP less consumption less taxes. Source: International Financial Statistics.
6in their turning points..
The UK exhibits the weakest connection between the savings￿ investment balance and the
current account. Although the two series generally comove before 1998, they diverge after-
wards with the current account experiencing a sharp deterioration and the saving-investment
imbalance continuing to improve.
Patterns in GDP and technology. Earlier attempts to model the US current account
focused on the evolution of US GDP relative to ROW in endowment settings [Engel and Rogers
(2006), Choi et al. (2008)]. Since saving and investment decisions depend heavily on output and
expectations of future output it is important for them to understand what factors are driving
changes in output￿ whether changes are primarily due to changes in inputs or technology. To
the extent that output movements are di⁄erent from movements in the technology, it may be
important to have a model with production and investment in studying the current account.
To shed light on these issues, Figure 4 plots each country￿ s relative-to-ROW GDP and relative
TFP (total factor productivity) as deviations from the mean.
For the US, relative GDP was comparatively ￿ at from 1970 to 1983 whereas relative TFP
was falling. Since 1985, after the onset of the ￿ Great Moderation,￿US relative GDP trends up
and grows substantially while US relative TFP also grows but at a slower rate. Over the entire
period, US relative GDP growth has outstripped relative TFP growth.
For Japan, trends in relative GDP and TFP show little connection to each other before
1981. The two series comove from 1981 to 1999 and diverge after that point. Relative GDP
grows substantially until 1992 and then declines in just as dramatic a fashion during the lost
decade and to a lesser extent after 2000.
The connection between relative TFP and GDP is tightest for the UK. The two series
generally move together over the entire sample.
To summarize, the dissimilarity between relative TFP and GDP for the U.S. and Japan
suggests the potential importance of working with a model with production as opposed to an
endowment model. This, and lack of comovement between budget de￿cits and the current
account lead us to focus on the (S ￿ I) component.
3 The Model
This section presents the two-country one-good DSGE model that we use for our quantitative
analysis. Except for the speci￿cation of the subjective discount factor in household preferences,
this is your ￿ garden variety￿international business cycle model. There is a government in each
7country that engages in wasteful spending. We assume that Ricardian equivalence holds so that
variations in budget de￿cits caused by changes in the timing of taxes don￿ t matter, although
the path of government spending levels do. We denote the Home country by ￿ 1￿and ROW by
￿ 2.￿
Household budget constraints. Let the representative household in country j have Nj;t
members. Home and ROW households trade the ￿nal good and a one-period nonstate con-
tingent private with each other. The bond pays one unit of the good next period and is in
zero net supply. The ￿rms of country j = 1;2 are entirely owned by country j households
and investment decisions are made by the ￿rms. In per capita terms, current wealth consists
of ￿rm dividends dj;t, labor income wj;t‘j;t, and bond interest income bj;t￿1. This is allocated
towards consumption cj;t, new private bond holdings bj;t; and to pay lump-sum taxes ￿j;t. Let
Vt be the current bond price observed by households: Then country j0s households face the
￿ ow budget constraint
Nj;t (cj;t + Vtbj;t) ￿ Nj;t (wj;t‘j;t + dj;t ￿ ￿j;t) + Nj;t￿1bj;t￿1: (1)
Preferences. Typically, it is assumed that agents subjectively discount future utilities at
a constant rate. International representative-agent macro models with FDF preferences, how-
ever, struggle to explain the US current account [Engel and Rogers (2006), Nason and Rogers
(2005), Choi et al. (2008)]. As seen in Figure 4a, US GDP relative to ROW has increased
quite steadily for some time. US households need to believe that a positive shock to relative
GDP predicts further more increases in relative GDP in order for savings rates and the current
account to decline as it did since 1991. The problem with this is that there is scant evidence
that the growth in relative US GDP was predicted.10 Thus, our point of departure then is to
relax the FDF assumption.
Households in each country are identical and in￿nitely lived. Normalizing the period time
endowment to 1, we write the expected lifetime utility of a country j household as de￿ned over




￿j;t￿1Nj;tu(cj;t;(1 ￿ ‘j;t)); (2)
10In examining survey data from Consensus Forecasts, Engel and Rogers (2006) report that professional
economic forecasters predicted US relative GDP to be ￿ at in the 1990s. After a decade of higher than expected
relative GDP, the Consensus Forecasts began to predict rising relative output.
8where the period utility function is constant relative risk aversion on a quasi Cobb-Douglas
index of consumption and leisure
u(cj;t;(1 ￿ ‘j;t)) =





where ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 0; and ￿j;t is the time and state dependent subjective discount factor.
Let cj;t be societal consumption at t and c￿
j;t be the steady-state value of societal consump-
tion. c￿
j;t; which may grow over time along a balanced growth path, is the reference point
for what households consider the normal level of consumption. In equilibrium, societal and
individual consumption in country j will coincide but at this point we maintain the distinction
between individual consumption cj;t and average societal consumption cj;t to make explicit
that the household takes societal consumption as external to its problem.





cause people to become
relatively impatient and transient but abnormally low consumption induce people to be rel-
atively patient. These variations in the subjective discount rate are described by the three
(￿;￿; ) parameter model of Choi et al. (2008),

















The one-period ahead discount factor ￿j;t; which plays a key role in the intertemporal Euler
equation, evolves with some persistence where the size of ￿ 2 [0;1) determines the degree of
current impatience inherited from the last period. The parameter   2 [0; ￿  ); ￿   < 1 regulates
the elasticity   (1 ￿ ￿) of the discount factor to abnormally high or low societal consumption.
In the steady state, cj;t = c￿
j;t and ￿j;t = ￿jt￿1 = ￿ 2 (0;1) which is equal across countries.
EDFs in economics. Uzawa (1968), working in a growth context, introduced a utility
function in which higher instantaneous utility causes agents to become more impatient. In
international macroeconomics, agents￿preferences were characterized with EDFs by Obstfeld
(1982) who employed a version of the Uzawa utility. In quantitative studies, EDF￿ s have been
assumed by Mendoza (1991), Schmidt￿ Grohe and Uribe (2003), Schmitt￿ Grohe (1998), and
Kim and Kose (2003). These are studies of small-open economies where the role of the EDF
is primarily a technical device to induce a stationary steady state in an incomplete markets
environment. In the two-country context, EDFs have been used by Choi et al. (2008) who
9study the US current account in an endowment model.11 These EDF￿ s employed in open-
economy macroeconomics are consistent with Uzawa￿ s (1968) idea that people are relatively
impatient in the high utility state.
The broader literature has explored implications of endogenous subjective discounting in
other contexts. Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that economists assume FDFs for the sake
of convenience but there is not a general presumption that subjective discount factors should
be constant. They point out that the EDF concept has been around at least since Fisher
(1930) and argue that variables such as wealth, mortality, and uncertainty can a⁄ect one￿ s rate
of time preference. They develop a theory that embodies Fisher￿ s (1930) conjecture that the
wealthy are more patient than the poor.12 Bhat and Ogaki (2008) employ EDFs to explain why
parental transfers to children may decrease when the child behaves irresponsibly (impatiently).
They also cite experimental studies in psychology that underscore the empirical plausibility of
endogenous discounting.
The use of EDFs can be motivated by Fehr and Schmidt￿ s (1999) concept of inequity
aversion. The idea here is that individuals engage in a process of social comparison and are
sensitive to what they perceive to be violations of self-centered fairness. That is, people care
primarily about fairness as it pertains to themselves but not about inequities among other
people. Fehr and Schmidt argue that their concept explains why people may be willing to
give up something to achieve a more equitable outcome such as why ￿rms may not cut wages
in a downturn or why experiments ￿nd that self-interested individuals cooperate with others.
In the macro setting, Fehr and Schmidt￿ s concept makes contact with our EDF in the sense
that in states of abnormally low societal consumption, people will reduce spending because
engaging in conspicuous consumption in states of the world when others are su⁄ering violates
one￿ s sense of fairness.
Empirical evidence that supports our EDF concept includes Juster et al. (2005) and Berben
et al. (2008). Using US household level panel data Juster et al. (2005) estimate that a $1000
capital gain on equities results in a reduction of saving by $190. In a study using a large
micro data set of Dutch households, Berben et al. (2008) ￿nd an even larger e⁄ect where a
e1,000 increase in wealth is associated with a e319 reduction in saving. These empirically
observed saving patterns and the implied patterns from our EDF are in turn is consistent with
11Yi (1993) studied a two-country endowment model where households value government purchases, G along
with private consumption C which enter utility through a Cobb-Douglas index. The growth of government
spending has the same e⁄ect as increasing impatience in our setup.
12Becker and Mulligan￿ s (1997) notion isn￿ t necessarily inconsistent with Uzawa￿ s idea because the Fisher
conjecture is about a cross-sectional relation whereas Uzawa￿ s is a time-series notion.
10bu⁄er-stock saving behavior discussed by Carroll (1997, 2001, 2004) exhibited by ￿nitely-lived
consumers who have a precautionary motive for saving.
Firms. Let Yj;t be output, Kj;t the capital stock, and Lj;t = Nj;txj;t‘j;t be labor input of
country j. The per capita labor input ‘j;t bene￿ts from labor-augmenting technical progress




where Aj;t is a technology shock inclusive of x1￿￿
j;t . The capital stock evolves as
Kj;t+1 = Ij;t + (1 ￿ ￿)Kj;t ￿ ￿(Ij;t;Kj;t); (7)







￿ (￿Y ￿ 1 + ￿)
￿2
Kj;t; (8)
and ￿Y is the gross growth rate of the economy. Dividends paid by ￿rms to their owners are
Nj;tdj;t = Dj;t = Yj;t ￿ wj;tLj;t ￿ Ij;t:




Qj;t (Yj;t ￿ wj;tLj;t ￿ Ij;t); (9)
subject to the production function (6) and the law of motion for the capital stock (7) under a
perfectly competitive environment. Since the country j ￿rms are owned by country j residents,
it follows that the equilibrium time discount factor for dividends must obey Qj;t+1=Qj;t =
￿j;tuj;Ct+1=uj;Ct where uj;Ct = @u(cj;t;1 ￿ lj;t)=@cj;t:
Government. Governments engage in wasteful spending Gj;t = Nj;tgj;t which they ￿nance
with lump-sum taxes Nj;t￿j;t: They face the ￿ ow budget constraint13
Njtgj;t = Nj;t￿j;t: (10)
13The government ￿nancing issues are not relevant to our analysis because these agents are Ricardian. This
is in line with the empirical evidence of the low explanatory power of budget de￿cits on current account de￿cits.
Thus, we could include government bonds in the model but they would be redundant.






(Nj;tcj;t + Ij;t + Gj;t); (11)
2 X
j=1
Nj;tbj;t = 0: (12)
(11) says that world output is either consumed by households or governments or is invested.
(12) says that the non state contingent bonds are in zero net supply. We can now state the
equilibrium of this model.
De￿nition. An equilibrium is a collection of allocations for consumers fcj;t;‘j;t;bj;tg
2
j=1 a
collection of allocations for ￿rms fYj;t;Ij;t;‘j;tg
2
j=1 ; real wages fwj;tg
2
j=1 and bond prices fVtg
such that the consumer allocations maximize (2) subject to (3)￿ (1), the ￿rm￿ s allocations max-
imize (9) subject to (6)￿ (8), and the resource constraints (11)￿ (12) are satis￿ed.
Upon solving the model, the current account balance to GDP ratio is computed as the





Solution, calibration, and parameter assignments
The model is solved by log-linearizing around a stationary steady state and assumes that
exogenous technology shocks and government consumption are driven by stationary (cyclical)
￿rst-order autoregressive processes. The parameters governing the exogenous state variables
are estimated from detrended total factor productivity and government spending data. In
detrending the data, we assumed that there is a balanced long-run per capita growth path and
imposed a common trend for Home (country 1) and ROW (country 2).14 For each Home￿ ROW
pair, let z1;t and z2;t be the detrended log Home and ROW technology shocks and let z3;t and
z4;t be detrended log Home and ROW government purchases. These are assumed to follow the
AR(1) process
zi;t = ￿izi;t￿1 + ￿i;t; i = 1;:::;4; (14)
14The productivity shock relates back to the production function as ln(Ait) = (1 ￿ ￿)xt+zit = [(1 ￿ ￿)￿Y ]t+
zit since we assume that xt grows at the constant rate ￿Y :
12where (￿1;t;￿2;t)
0 nid ￿ (0;￿); and (￿3;t;￿4;t)
0 nid ￿ (0;!): Note that the technology shock innovation
￿1;t may be contemporaneously correlated with ￿2;t and the government spending innovation
￿3;t may be contemporaneously correlated with ￿4;t but the technology shock innovations are
not correlated with the government spending innovations.
For commonly encountered parameters, we assign values that are standard in the literature.
We set capital depreciation at 10 percent per annum, the risk aversion parameter at 2, capital￿ s
share at 0.34 the adjustment cost parameter at 0.5, and the steady-state subjective discount
factor at 0.96. These assignments are recorded in Table 1.






Taking the common parameter values and parameters governing the exogenous state vari-
ables as given, the discount factor parameters are estimated with Bayesian MCMC (Markov
chain monte Carlo) methods using Dynare. The data used in estimation are consumption
to output ratios for Home and ROW. For the US￿ ROW case, the parameter estimates are
shown in Table 2. The estimates imply that the discount factor is persistent and slow moving
(￿ is relatively large). The implied discount factor elasticity with respect to consumption is
  (1 ￿ ￿) = 0:006: Starting at a steady state discount factor ￿ = 0:96 a 2 percent increase in
consumption increases the discount factor and implies a modest reduction in the rate of time
preference from 4.167 percent to 4.156 percent in the current period.
13Table 2: Parameter values for the US￿ ROW model
Parameter Estimate s.e. Error variances and covariances
Technology ￿1 0.809 0.094 ￿11 (0:0137)
2
￿2 0.959 0.075 ￿22 (0:0179)
2
￿12 4:8 ￿ 10￿5
Government ￿3 0.926 0.037 !11 (0:0134)
2
￿4 0.954 0.049 !22 (0:0178)
2
!12 4:7 ￿ 10￿5
Posterior Mean Con￿dence Interval (90%)
Discount ￿ 0.977 0.976 0.977
factor   0.245 0.242 0.227
3.1 Impulse responses under US-ROW parameter settings
In addition to the parameter values discussed above, we assume the relative size of ROW to
the US is constant and set the ratio to N2;t=N1;t = 1:74 which is the sample average of the
GDP ratio. The responses are percent deviations from the steady state and are reported both
under EDF and FDF speci￿cations. Hollow symbols denote FDF model responses whereas
solid symbols denote EDF responses. Responses of US variables are plotted with squares and
responses of ROW variables are plotted with circles.15
Responses to a positive Home (US) technology shock. These results are shown in
Figure 5. We see that for the traditional (FDF) business cycle model, a positive Home technol-
ogy shock leads to increased Home consumption, investment, labor input, and output. ROW
consumption also increases, but ROW investment, labor input, and output decline. Also, the
interest rate increases and the Home current account goes into surplus. The initial improvement
in the technology increases the Home real wage which leads to increased labor supply. Through
the labor￿ leisure choice Euler equation, Home consumption increases. The higher technology
also increases capital productivity which increases Home investment. Because the technology
shock is transient, Home agents have a consumption smoothing motive and attempt to transfer
some of the consumption value of the shock into the future. They do this by attracting the
ROW to increase consumption which is channeled through the Home current account surplus.
15In the FDF model, we include a very small cost to holding bonds to ensure that there is a ￿xed steady
state. The cost is small enough so that the short-run dynamic responses are una⁄ected.
14From the ROW labor￿ leisure Euler equation, the increased consumption reduces ROW labor
input which then leads to a decline in ROW capital productivity, investment, and output.
Next, examine the solid symbols that represent responses under EDF preferences. Here, a
positive technology shock increases Home consumption and Home labor input but higher con-
sumption now makes Home agents less patient. The Home discount factor declines and induces
a larger jump in consumption than when the discount factor is constant. The magni￿cation in
the consumption response attenuates the increase in labor input which in turn dampens the
response of output, the marginal product of capital, and investment. Because Home desires to
consume more, less of the output gain is shared with ROW which results in a smaller current
account surplus under EDF. This results in a smaller increase in ROW consumption, labor
input, and output.
Another di⁄erence between the EDF and FDF models is that under EDF, there is a reversal
of the current account during the adjustment. The relative impatience of Home keeps Home
consumption high farther into the future as output declines back towards its steady state
value. Eventually, Home consumption lies above output and the current account switches
from a surplus to a de￿cit. As Home￿ s debt burden grows over time, the current account will
again reverse. The long-run approach to the steady state can be oscillatory.
Responses to a positive ROW technology shock. With FDF preferences, Figure 6 shows
that the responses to a positive ROW technology shock are qualitatively similar to the responses
to a US shock. ROW consumption, investment, labor and output increase as does Home
consumption. Home￿ s current account, investment, labor and output decline. The ROW
technology shock is substantially more persistent than the US shock (￿2 = 0:959 versus ￿1 =
0:809) and this additional persistence causes these impulse responses to be more persistent
than the responses to the US technology shock.
Under EDF preferences, ROW consumption, investment, labor and output increase, and
US investment, labor, and output decline. However, the US consumption response to the
ROW technology shock is not symmetric to the ROW consumption response to a US shock.
Here, US consumption declines following the ROW shock. Because of the high persistence of
the ROW shock, ROW households view it as closer to a permanent shock than a transient
one. As a result of this and the relative impatience that it imparts, ROW consumption is
more responsive to the technology shock and more persistent. ROW￿ s desire for consumption
is su¢ ciently great that it borrows from Home who cuts back on its consumption and runs a
current account surplus. A sequence of positive ROW technology shocks would help the US to
bring its current account back into balance.
15Responses to a positive US government spending shock. Figure 7 shows the re-
sponses to a positive US government spending shock. Under FDF, the shock raises Home and
ROW labor input and output, lowers Home and ROW consumption and ROW investment, and
has very small e⁄ect on Home investment. The increased government consumption leaves fewer
resources available at Home so that Home consumption needs to decline and Home labor input
to rise. Since investment increases at Home due to an increase in capital productivity resulting
from higher labor inputs, the adjustment comes by crowding out consumption. This leads to
an increase in Home output and a current account deterioration as the jump in output and
contraction in consumption are more than o⁄set by increased government consumption. The
current account surplus experienced by ROW is generated by a decline in ROW consumption
and investment. The increase in demand at Home raises ROW output, which comes from an
increase in ROW labor input. Thus the government spending shock leads people to work more
and consume less.
The qualitative responses are the same under EDF. Home country responses are magni￿ed,
however, and except for investment, ROW responses are dampened. When the government
spending shock hits, reduced Home consumption increases the discount factor. The relative
patience of Home agents attenuates the decline of the current account and increases Home
investment.
The impulse responses following a shock to ROW government expenditures are very similar
and are put in the appendix to save on space.
4 An explanation of trending current accounts
This section reports on our attempt to use the model to explain the current account time series
of the US, Japan, and the UK from 1970 to 2005. We run the economy by showing agents in
the model the historical technology and government spending data which they consider to be
the realization of the exogenous state vector. We then compare the current account implied
by choices made by people in the model to the choices made by people in the real world (the
current account data). Paths implied by FDF and EDF versions of the model are generated
for comparison. In each case, the model is calibrated to match the initial (1970) level of the
Home country￿ s international indebtedness.16
The US current account. Figure 8 shows the results of this experiment for the US. The
FDF model overstates the level of the current account. Before 1991 the FDF current account
16That is, we choose initial bond holdings b1;t￿1 such that the model matches cay1970 ￿ tby1970 in the data.
16shows a slight downward trend but is excessively volatile. Also, the timing of the implied
turning points are a poor match to the data. A more serious embarrassment for the FDF
model is that it predicts a counterfactual sustained current account improvement from 1991
through 2005 which culminates in an implied surplus of 8 percent of GDP. This is qualitatively
similar to the path generated by Engel and Rogers (2006). The correlation between the data
and the FDF current account is -0.40 in levels and 0.03 in ￿rst di⁄erences.
The EDF model captures the overall downward trend of the current account throughout
the sample. This model also mimics the dominant cyclical movements around the trend and
is generally able to replicate the turning points. Between 1970 and 1997, the model￿ s turning
points lead the data by a year or two. Especially noteworthy is the ability of the model to
capture the acceleration in the current account deterioration from 2000 through 2005. The
correlation between the data and the EDF implied current account is 0.82 in levels and 0.50
in ￿rst di⁄erences.
The EDF model enjoys two additional degrees of freedom over the FDF model, so is it
the case that any ￿ve-parameter model of preferences can explain these data? To address this
question, consider the model in which household preferences exhibit habit persistence. We let
the country￿ wide stock of consumption habit hj;t; evolve according to
hj;t = ￿hhj;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿h)￿ cj;t: (15)










We set the parameter values ￿h = 0:85 and ￿ = 0:85 to bias the results in favor of the model
by making the habits be very persistent. This increases the in￿ uence of habit on intertemporal
decisions.17 Figure 9 shows the external habit current account follows the same general pattern
as the FDF current account but the path implied by the habit model lie even farther away
from the data.
To see why this is the case, consider the dynamic response following a technology shock. Un-
der FDF preferences, a positive shock increases the interest rate and next period￿ s consumption
17Gruber (2004) derived a present value model for the current account based on habit formations and found
that the estimated value of ￿; with ￿h = 0; for the U.S. is 0.816 and signi￿cant. Also, in the literature with
habit formations, the persistence parameter value of 0.65 is widely used for quarterly frequency simulations.
In our simulation exercises, we intentionally assign higher values for these parameters to show that even with
strong e⁄ects of habits, the model does not perform well in predicting the time paths of the current accounts in
the U.S. For a wide range of the parameter values, the model predictions are similar.
17growth. Under habit, the interest rate is related to the di⁄erence between consumption growth
and habit growth whereas under FDF it is related only to consumption growth. Thus habit
allows a smoother consumption response to the technology shock. Because the low-frequency
movements of the current account arise primarily from changes in saving motivations, the habit
model fails to explain the current account due to the intensi￿cation of consumption smoothing
that comes with habits.
Achieving balance in the US current account. The impulse response analysis showed
that the current account improves in the short run following positive US and ROW technology
shocks, negative US government spending shocks and positive ROW government spending
shocks. If we take the history up through 2005 as given and shut down future innovations to
three of the four exogenous state variables, what does the path of the fourth variable look like
if the US current account is to be balanced in ￿ve years?
Obviously, future paths of the exogenous state variables that achieve a balanced current
account are not unique, and our calculations do not necessarily achieve the balance with smooth
landing. Under one such set of future paths for the EDF model, a zero current account can
be achieved if for ￿ve years, US total factor productivity grows at 7 percent per year, if ROW
total factor productivity grows at 2.7 percent per year, if ROW government spending grows by
26 percent per year or if US government spending declines by 22 percent per year. Achieving
balance by ￿scal contraction would be even more drastic than the adjustments undertaken at
the state level by California. If current US government purchases are normalized to be 100,
government￿ s size would have to decline to 33.3 in year ￿ve.
The Japanese current account. The relative size of ROW to Japan is set as N2=N1 = 4:89
where ROW is composed of the U.S. and the 23 highest income OECD countries without Japan.
Parameters that characterize the long-run behavior of the model are set as listed in Table 1.
However, just as one would not want to force the parameters that govern the technology and
government spending processes to be the same here, there is no compelling reason to force
di⁄erent societies to have the same short-run discount factor dynamics. As we did for the
US, we obtain Bayesian MCMC estimates of   and ￿ for Japan￿ ROW using consumption and
income data. These, and estimated parameters for the exogenous state variables ares shown
in Table 3. Here, the discount factor is estimated to be less persistent than in the US case.
The discount factor elasticity with respect to consumption is   (1 ￿ ￿) = 0:051. A two percent
increase in consumption would imply a decline in the subjective rate of time preference from
4:167 to 4:065 percent.
18Table 3: Parameter values for the Japanese model
Parameter Estimate s.e. Error variances and covariances
Technology ￿1 0:896 0:057 ￿11 (0:021)
2
￿2 0:744 0:116 ￿22 (0:017)
2
￿12 8:302 ￿ 10￿5
Government ￿3 0:936 0:0168 !11 (0:017)
2
￿4 0:929 0:0541 !22 (0:015)
2
!12 ￿1:094 ￿ 10￿6
Posterior mean Con￿dence interval (90%)
Discount ￿ 0:792 0:778 0:809
factor   0:246 0:238 0:255
The data and implied current accounts for Japan are shown in Figure 10. The FDF model
performs poorly. It over predicts current account surpluses by an order of magnitude from the
data (over 30 percent of GDP in 1992), it trends in the wrong direction from 1992 to 2000,
and it captures almost none of the cyclical ￿ uctuations. The correlation between the data and
the FDF predicted current account is -0.26 in levels and -0.14 in ￿rst di⁄erences.
The EDF model successfully matches the sustained upward trend in the current account
data and generally mimics the cyclical ￿ uctuations. The implied turning points are in accord
with turning points in the data (1979, 1986, 1990, 1996), and lead by one year those turning
points in 1974, 2001, and 2004. The correlation between the data and the EDF predicted
current account is 0.40 in levels. In ￿rst di⁄erences from 1971 to 2005, the correlation is
￿0:06; however from 1975 to 2005 it is 0:14.
The UK current account. Parameter estimates of short-run parameters for the UK model
are shown in Table 4. The technology shocks and the discount factor shows less persistence
for the UK compared to the US and Japan. The estimated elasticity of the discount factor to
consumption implies that a two percent increase in consumption would lower the subjective
discount rate from 4:167 to 3:629 percent.
19Table 4: Parameter values for the UK model
Parameter Estimate (s.e.) Error variances and covariances
Technology ￿1 0:844 (0:094) ￿11 (0:022)
2
￿2 0:830 (0:102) ￿22 (0:016)
2
￿12 2:174 ￿ 10￿4
Government ￿3 0:888 (0:079) !11 (0:015)
2
￿4 0:935 (0:025) !22 (0:013)
2
!12 5:973 ￿ 10￿5
Posterior mean Con￿dence interval (90%)
Discount ￿ 0:429 0:423 0:434
factor   0:463 0:463 0:464
Figure 11 shows the implied current account paths for UK￿ ROW. The relative size of ROW
to the UK is set at 15.06. The FDF model predicts a sustained and counterfactual decline in
the UK current account from an 8 percent of GDP surplus in 1970 to nearly a 10 percent de￿cit
in 1983. Except for a few years between 1970 and 1974, the FDF current account generally
moves in the opposite direction from the data. The correlation between the FDF prediction
and the data is -0.18 in levels and -0.29 in ￿rst di⁄erences.
The EDF implied current account does not show a trend and generally matches the magni-
tude, directional movements, volatility and turning points of the data. The EDF model leads
the 1974 reversal by a year, matches the 1981 break, leads the 1989 reversal by two years and
matches the 1998 reversal. The correlation between the EDF predicted current account and
the data is 0.36 in levels and 0.10 in ￿rst di⁄erences.
5 Conclusions
Persistently trending current accounts have posed a challenge for intertemporal macroeconomic
models. The data suggests that persistently trending current accounts for the US and Japan
are driven primarily by a saving imbalance of that country relative to the rest of the world.
Investment dynamics do not appear to be a key driver of the trends but are an important
element concerning ￿ uctuations of these current accounts around the trend.
This paper shows that a two-country one-good business cycle model populated with rep-
resentative households with state-dependent subjective discount factors creates saving and
20investment dynamics that has high explanatory power for the current account. The model
is capable of explaining the downward trending US current account, the upward trending
Japanese current account, the magnitudes and timing of ￿ uctuations around the trend, and
the nontrending UK current account. We are not arguing that endogenous subjective discount-
ing is the only explanation for trending current accounts. Other mechanisms such as changing
demographic patterns and lifecycle e⁄ects, changing perceptions of risk and implications for
precautionary saving, market imperfections and so on are potentially quite important. The
point that we want to underscore is that embedding the endogenous discount factor in pref-
erences is a su¢ cient ingredient in the representative household business cycle framework to
produce an account of these trending current accounts. Ours is, to our knowledge, the ￿rst
paper to achieve a faithful and realistic replication of these data.
The behavioral implications that are key for our purpose though is that individuals (and
countries) will tend to borrow or to save less in good states of nature and to save or borrow
less in bad states. Endogenous discount factors have been employed in other research in
international economics, but this is the ￿rst paper to do so in a business-cycle model to explain
the current account. Neither the standard model whose households have a ￿xed subjective
discount factor nor preferences that exhibit habit persistence comes even close to explaining
the data.
21Appendix 1. Data sources
Data description. All real variables stated in constant US dollars by converting constant
foreign currency unit values into 2000 US dollars by 2000 o¢ cial nominal exchange rates. This
method follows the recommendation by Engel and Rogers (2006). To obtain quantities for
ROW, we sum up these real values in 2000 USD for 23 high income OECD countries (less home
country under consideration) whose 2005 per capita gross national income exceeded $10.726
. The 23 high income countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
GDP is measured at purchaser￿ s prices, which is the sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the
value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
Real government expenditures, real investment, consumption, GDP, and the 2000 nominal
exchange rate obtained from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators, except for the
US whose data comes from the OECD￿ s Quarterly National Accounts. Total employment ob-
tained from International Labour Organization￿ s Labor Statistics Data Base. Current account
data for the US, Japan, and the UK from 1970￿ 1992 generously provided by Alan Taylor.
From 1993￿ 2005, these data are from the World Development Indicators. Japanese tax data
from the International Monetary Fund￿ s International Financial Statistics Database. US tax
data from the Economic Report of the President. UK surplus on current budget of the public
sector obtained from UK Government O¢ ce National Statistics.
Capital stocks are constructed using the perpetual inventory method inclusive of adjust-
ment costs. Our data on real investment begins in 1960 so to estimate the initial (1960) capital
stock, we ￿rst estimate the 10 year (linear) trend of log investment from 1960-1969. Second,
we assume that the capital stock in 1960 is on the trend,
K1960 =
I1960;trend
(e￿I ￿ 1 + ￿)
where ￿I is the 10 year trend, and ￿ is the depreciation rate. The capital data series is then
built up recursively using the formula






￿ (￿ ￿ 1 + ￿)
￿2
Kt;
where ￿ is the trend of the aggregate economy which is obtained from the Home and ROW
common GDP trend estimation from 1970-2005, The adjustment cost coe¢ cient is set to
￿K = 0:5.
226 Appendix 2. Not for Publication. UK and Japan Impulse
Responses
Impulse responses to technology for Japan￿ ROW
23Impulse responses to government shock for Japan￿ ROW
24As in the text, we use squares for Home country responses, circles for ROW responses,
solid symbols for the model with EDFs and hollow symbols for the model with FDFs.
Japanese technology shock. Under FDF preferences, a positive shock to Japanese technology
raises their consumption, investment, labor input, and output. Because Japan￿ s economy is
much smaller than the US, this model behaves more like a small open economy. The Japanese
technology shock has almost no e⁄ect on ROW variables. Except for a de￿cit in the initial
period, a positive technology shock sends the Japanese current account into surplus on account
of the smoothing motive.
Under EDF preferences, the positive Japanese technology shock generates and even larger
increase in Home consumption and investment, a smaller increase in output. Because the
e⁄ect on consumption is magni￿ed to such an extent, leisure increases and the labor input
declines which dampens the expansion in Japanese output. To pay for the large expansion
in consumption and investment, which outweigh the expansion in output, the current account
must decline.
ROW technology shock. A positive ROW technology shock generates the qualitatively tra-
ditional response patterns under FDF and EDF preferences. Consumption and investment
increases in Japan and in the ROW. Labor input increases in ROW but declines in Japan.
ROW is in e⁄ect, sharing the positive shock with Japan. For a given real wage, the increased
Japanese consumption needs to be accompanied by an increase in leisure. As a result, Japanese
labor input declines. The positive ROW technology shock sends the Japanese current account
into de￿cit.
Japanese government spending shock. A positive shock to Japanese government spending has
almost no e⁄ect on the ROW. At home, output, investment, and labor input all increase while
consumption is crowded out and the current account goes into de￿cit.
ROW government spending shock. The qualitative response is the same under FDF and EDF.
The ROW government spending shock causes Japanese consumption and investment to decline,
labor input and output to increase. ROW investment, labor input, and output increase while
ROW consumption declines. The Japanese current account goes into surplus.
The impulse responses for UK￿ ROW are qualitatively the same as those for Japan￿ ROW.
25Impulse responses to technology for UK￿ ROW
26Impulse responses to government for UK￿ ROW
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